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Obama Administration Revamps 
Approach to Terrorism Suspects
Barack Obama faces the incredible task 
of reshaping the U.S. response to terrorism 
and to terrorism suspects. Over the last 
eight years, extraordinary rendition and the 
state secrets privilege became increasingly 
more prevalent as part of the U.S. approach 
to terrorism.
Beginning in the 1990s, the U.S. Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency (CIA), along with 
other government agencies, established the 
extraordinary rendition program involving 
the transfer of terrorist suspects to deten-
tion facilities in foreign countries. Suspects 
were detained and interrogated either by 
U.S. or foreign officials in these “secret 
prisons.” Prior to the September 11, 2001 
attacks on the U.S., the program was very 
limited in nature. Former President George 
W. Bush expanded the program dramati-
cally and increased the number of foreign 
nationals suspected of terrorism sent to 
detention facilities in Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, 
Afghanistan, and Guantánamo Bay. The 
brutal, inhumane interrogation methods 
utilized at these detention facilities are 
prohibited under federal and international 
laws such as the United Nations Conven-
tion Against Torture and Other Forms of 
Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment.
Several challenges to extraordinary ren-
dition have come before U.S. courts in the 
last few years but have been unsuccessful 
due to the adoption of the state secrets 
privilege. The state secrets privilege allows 
the government to prohibit the release of 
information in a lawsuit if that information 
would harm national security. The DOJ 
frequently utilized the privilege, especially 
under the Bush administration, in defend-
ing against charges such as warrantless 
wiretaps and rendition and, in some cases, 
prevented lawsuits from continuing as in 
El-Masri v. Tenet. El-Masri charged former 
CIA Director George Tenet with authoriz-
ing others to abduct, to beat and drug, and 
to transport him to a secret CIA prison in 
Afghanistan. The CIA continued holding 
El-Masri even after his innocence became 
known. A judge dismissed the case, adopt-
ing the CIA and Department of Justice 
(DOJ) argument that the lawsuit would 
jeopardize state secrets.
More recently, the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) sued a Boeing 
subsidiary, Jeppesen DataPlan, for par-
ticipating in the extraordinary rendition 
of five men. Under both the Bush and 
Obama administrations, the DOJ again 
asserted the state secrets privilege, claim-
ing the ACLU’s lawsuit would undermine 
national security. Under President Obama’s 
administration, the DOJ again asserted the 
state secrets privilege in a suit by the al-
Haramain Islamic Foundation challenging 
warrantless wiretaps.
Although it has adopted the state secrets 
privilege, the new administration is chang-
ing other approaches to addressing ter-
rorism. In direct opposition to the Bush 
administration’s detention methods for ter-
rorism suspects, President Obama issued 
an executive order banning torture and 
ordering the closure of the detention facili-
ties at Guantánamo Bay Naval Base within 
a year. The order requires the prompt and 
thorough review of the factual and legal 
bases for the continued detention of all 
individuals held at Guantánamo, as well 
as determinations regarding who should be 
prosecuted or released.
Unfortunately, despite Obama’s execu-
tive order, current conditions at Guan-
tanamo still violate U.S. obligations under 
the Geneva Convention and international 
human rights law. The Center for Constitu-
tional Rights (CCR) recently reported that 
abusive conditions continue, including sol-
itary confinement and sensory deprivation 
which can lead to permanent psychological 
and physical damage. CCR listed several 
recommendations to ensure compliance 
with Obama’s executive order standards for 
humane treatment while the Guantánamo 
detention facility closes. They include end-
ing (1) solitary confinement, (2) religious 
abuse such as violations of detainees’ right 
to practice their religion, (3) sensory depri-
vation such as temperature manipulation 
and sleep deprivation, (4) force-feeding 
detainees, and (5) prohibitions on indepen-
dent access to medical and psychological 
professionals.
Immigration Reform
“The time to fix our broken immigra-
tion system is now. It is critical that . . . it 
is fully reflective of the powerful tradition 
of immigration in this country and fully 
reflective of our values and ideals.” In this 
statement to the Senate, President Obama 
acknowledged that the heated immigra-
tion reform debate of the last several years 
needs to end. The approximately 12 million 
immigrants in the U.S. represent a valu-
able asset to the U.S. economy and to U.S. 
culture. President Obama, addressing the 
Congressional Hispanic Caucus, signaled 
that he will take on the challenge of reform 
before the end of 2009.
To begin reform of immigration deten-
tion facilities, Representative Lucille 
Roybal-Allard introduced legislation that 
would provide protections for detainees. 
The bill includes access to medical care, 
phones, legal materials, and law libraries. 
It provides specific protection for children, 
sexual abuse victims, survivors of torture, 
and families. Although the bill is a promis-
ing start, it only addresses detention facili-
ties and detainees. The National Alliance 
of Latin American & Caribbean Commu-
nities (NALACC) and the ACLU focus on 
providing a path for undocumented immi-
grants to earn legal status and on protect-
ing immigrants’ constitutional and human 
rights; both are vital to any comprehensive 
immigration reform.
Although criticized and debated heavily, 
any comprehensive immigration reform 
must include a path for undocumented 
immigrants in the U.S. to earn legal sta-
tus. The current system separates family 
members and forces people to abandon 
everything they know. The combination 
of high application fees and an incredibly 
long legalization process makes it nearly 
impossible for individuals to become U.S. 
citizens. To fix the system, there must be a 
change in attitudes. The NALACC stresses 
placing a greater overall emphasis on keep-
ing families together. In providing a path 
to legalization, the NALACC made several 
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recommendations such as limiting process-
ing of immigration benefits applications 
to six months, providing undocumented 
immigrants the opportunity to become 
legal permanent residents, and creating a 
foreign worker program to allow a worker 
to remain in the U.S. for a reasonable 
amount of time.
The ACLU, in its immigrants’ rights 
advocacy, recognizes that the U.S. has 
the authority to decide who may enter or 
remain in the country, but that author-
ity must be exercised fairly, humanely, 
and subject to constitutional norms. All 
“persons” have the right to due process 
and equal protection under the U.S. Con-
stitution regardless of legal status. A com-
prehensive reform bill should include 
provisions protecting constitutional rights 
such as limiting restrictions on federal 
court review and prohibiting deportation 
based on suspicion without proof. The 
bill should address harsh treatment by law 
enforcement agencies such as Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement, specifically in 
their methods of conducting immigration 
raids and detention facilities.
The ACLU also supports the idea that 
any bill introduced must not violate pri-
vacy, unlike the Employment Eligibility 
Verification System (E-Verify). Computer 
databases and systems, such as E-Verify, 
require employers to check the legal sta-
tus of employees in massive government 
databases, essentially turning employers 
into immigration law enforcers. Inevitably, 
such systems lead to employment discrimi-
nation on the basis of race and ethnicity, 
while placing huge burdens on businesses. 
A better option is a guest worker program 
which gives employers better access to 
legal foreign workers and allows illegal 
immigrants to remain in the country while 
continuing to work, thus preventing pri-
vacy violations.
Faith-Based Initiatives
President Obama signed an executive 
order on February 5, 2009, establishing 
the Council for Faith-Based and Neighbor-
hood Partnerships (Council). The Coun-
cil, known as the Office of Faith-Based 
and Community Initiatives under Pres-
ident George W. Bush’s administration, 
coordinates religious groups addressing 
U.S. social issues. The Council’s priorities 
include making community groups an inte-
gral part of encouraging economic recov-
ery, ending poverty, supporting women and 
children, addressing teenage pregnancy, 
reducing abortion, encouraging responsible 
fatherhood, and reaching out to the Muslim 
world and interfaith leaders. In his guide-
lines for the Council, President Obama, 
a former professor of constitutional law, 
attempted to alleviate the constitutional 
concerns raised by the Bush administra-
tion’s controversial office.
Separation of church and state is one 
of the biggest concerns of critics of fed-
erally funded faith-based initiatives and 
programs. Particularly concerning was the 
Bush-era practice of awarding federal con-
tracts to religious groups of the president’s 
own faith. In essence, the Bush office also 
allowed these federally-funded groups to 
perpetuate religious discrimination in their 
hiring practices. President Obama hoped 
to prevent these problems by elaborating a 
few principles that ensure the separation of 
church and state. First, churches and reli-
gious groups may not use federal grants to 
proselytize to individuals receiving assis-
tance. Second, religious groups may not 
perpetuate religious discrimination in their 
hiring practices or in their provision of ser-
vices. Third, federal dollars that churches 
and faith-based groups receive can only be 
used for secular programs.
“With these principles as a guide, my 
Council for Faith-Based and Neighborhood 
Partnerships will strengthen faith-based 
groups by making sure they know the 
opportunities open to them to build on their 
good works,” stated President Obama. The 
goal of the initiative is to bring together 
many perspectives to solve the nation’s 
social problems and to improve American 
communities of all religious, secular, and 
political beliefs. President Obama further 
stated that the goal “will simply be to work 
on behalf of those organizations that want 
to work on behalf of our communities, and 
to do so without blurring the line that our 
founders wisely drew between church and 
state.”
Latin america
Constitutional Referendum Leads to 
Land Redistribution in Bolivia
On March 15, 2009, Bolivia redistrib-
uted over 94,000 acres of land, mostly to 
indigenous farmers, after the nation passed 
a constitutional referendum this January. 
President Evo Morales said that the redis-
tribution encourages people to put country 
over profit and ends human rights viola-
tions against indigenous people. Bolivia 
seized the redistributed land from five 
big ranches in Bolivia’s wealthy eastern 
lowlands. Morales explained that, “It is not 
that these lands were not in production, but 
that they were the site of human rights vio-
lations against the Guaraní, who will now 
be their new owners.”
The land transfer followed the Janu-
ary approval of a new Constitution. Key 
reforms in the governing charter include an 
entire chapter devoted to indigenous rights 
that stresses the importance of ethnicity in 
Bolivia’s makeup, the establishment of an 
indigenous system of justice that has the 
same status as the official existing system 
and where judges will be elected and no 
longer appointed by the Congress, and a 
12,355 acre limit on land ownership. “Pri-
vate property will always be respected but 
we want people who are not interested in 
equality to change their thinking and focus 
more on country than currency,” Morales 
said.
In an effort to appease wealthy land-
owners, Morales did not make land limita-
tion retroactive. Despite this concession, 
four of Bolivia’s nine regions voted “no,” 
on the constitutional referendum. The 
greatest opposition to the reform and land 
redistribution was in the eastern lowlands 
region, where most of Bolivia’s wealth is 
concentrated. Opposition strongholds in 
Santa Cruz, Tarija, Beni and Pando, easily 
defeated the referendum. “The ‘No’ vote 
has put the brakes on the fools who wanted 
to destroy our country,” argued opposition 
leader and Santa Cruz Governor Rubén 
Costas. Bolivians, however, approved the 
referendum by 61%. During the celebra-
tion of the referendum’s victory, Morales 
announced: “[h]ere we begin to reach true 
equality for all Bolivians.”
Morales—an Aymara Indian and for-
mer leader of coca-leaf farmers—is Boliv-
ia’s first indigenous president and enjoys 
broad support amongst indigenous Boliv-
ians. Morales enjoys particular popular-
ity amongst the Aymara, Quechua, and 
Guaraní indigenous groups that suffered 
centuries of discrimination. In fact, only 
50 years ago, indigenous people of Aymara 
and Quechua descent were prohibited from 
entering the central square of La Paz. The 
new constitution aims to establish what 
some Bolivians are calling a “plurinational 
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state.” The goal is an all-inclusive soci-
ety where different groups coexist, and 
where everyone enjoys full legal protec-
tion. “Today, from here, we are beginning 
to put an end to the giant landholdings of 
Bolivia,” Morales said.
Ortega’s Nicaragua May Be Sliding 
Towards Autocracy
Opposition leaders in Nicaragua criti-
cized President Daniel Ortega Saavedra’s 
call for constitutional reform to allow a 
second presidential term. While extend-
ing term limits is not per se undemocratic, 
other Ortega policies suggest that he is 
leading the country down a path towards 
autocracy.
Ortega, of the Sandinista National Lib-
eration Front (FSLN, known as the “San-
dinistas”), served as president from 1985 
to 1990. He returned to the presidency in 
2007. In March 2009, Ortega criticized 
constitutional provisions prohibiting him 
from running for re-election as unfair. 
“The President can’t be re-elected. Only 
the congressman can be re-elected. It is 
not just, it denies the people of their right 
to choose,” said Ortega.
The opposition says that an attempt to 
change the constitution to allow Ortega 
to run again will undermine democracy. 
Yet some democracies in the hemisphere, 
including Brazil and the United States, 
allow presidents to serve multiple terms. 
Moreover, some credit the dramatic secu-
rity improvements in Colombia over the 
last six years to a 2005 constitutional 
reform that allowed President Álvaro 
Uribe serve a second term. It is clear 
that transition periods between presidential 
administrations—marked by hiring staff, 
developing policy priorities, and craft-
ing implementing strategies—consume a 
larger percentage of the overall adminis-
tration for single presidential terms than 
for multiple presidential terms. Therefore, 
multiple presidential terms may allow pres-
idents to spend more time governing than 
preparing agendas.
Ortega’s attempts to amend the constitu-
tion place him at odds with the Congress. 
An amendment will require a majority 
of Congress, something Ortega and his 
party currently do not have. Ortega also 
applauded Venezuelan President Hugo 
Chávez’s recent referendum victory allow-
ing Chávez to run for multiple terms. Yet 
Venezuela may not be an ideal reference 
since Chávez’s referendum abolished term 
limits altogether.
If seeking to amend the constitution to 
allow multiple presidential terms is not 
per se undemocratic, Nicaraguans also 
protested election results this November 
after Ortega’s Sandinista party won 105 
of 146 municipal races. Violence briefly 
erupted after right-wing parties accused 
Sandinistas of fraud. The Wall Street Jour-
nal also accused the Sandinistas of using 
“violence [as] a key campaign tactic.” In 
response, the United States and several 
European nations froze some $62 million 
in developmental aid over concerns that 
Ortega and his party rigged the November 
elections. The U.S. Millennium Challenge 
Corporation (MCC) upheld the suspension 
in a decision this March after it identified 
over 40 mayoral posts that the Sandinistas 
allegedly stole. Ortega has been defiant in 
the face of foreign criticism, stating that 
“[t]he [United States] and some European 
[nations] are saying that they are going to 
take away our bread if we don’t negotiate 
the municipal governments. But the munic-
ipal governments will not be negotiated.”
Nicaragua’s slide towards autocracy, 
however, extends beyond the allegedly 
rigged local elections. Ortega has deployed 
gangs of uniformed thugs to break up oppo-
sition protests in the wake of the municipal 
protests and his growing unpopularity. One 
Sandinista leader who now finds himself in 
the opposition likens the current political 
state to that of the 1970s, under the coun-
try’s infamous dictator, Anastasio Somoza. 
The former Sandinista says he feels forced 
to meet contacts in secret, “as we used to 
do under Somoza.”
The international community is losing 
patience with Ortega, and as such, Nica-
ragua loses foreign investors and business 
that are critical to its people’s standard of 
living. The result, therefore, has been a 
weakened state that is sliding towards the 
very autocracy against which Ortega once 
led a revolution.
Renewed Wiretapping Abuses in 
Colombia: 479 Words
Colombian President Álvaro Uribe 
halted the nation’s wiretapping program in 
February amidst claims the secret police, 
known as the Administrative Department 
of Security (Departamento Administrativo 
de Seguridad, DAS) illegally wiretapped 
prominent journalists, Supreme Court jus-
tices, and opposition politicians. Eaves-
dropping is a major crime-fighting weapon 
in Colombia against drug mafias, leftist 
rebels and right-wing paramilitaries. Law 
enforcement agencies have extensive wire-
tapping powers and equipment, and admit 
that the potential for abuse is great. DAS, 
which has approximately 6,000 employees, 
has been particularly rife with scandal dur-
ing the Uribe administration.
Uribe’s first DAS director, a former 
campaign director named Jorge Noguera, 
is in prison awaiting trial for colluding with 
right-wing death squads. Another director, 
María Pilar Hurtado, resigned last October 
after an opposition senator leaked a memo 
showing that Hurtado ordered surveil-
lance of the senator. Several DAS officials 
resigned after the news magazine Semana 
broke the story of illegal surveillance this 
February. Uribe decried illegal wiretap-
ping and has blamed corrupt agents for the 
scandals. Some critics, however, think that 
the Uribe government may have benefited 
from the wiretaps. Opposition leaders even 
believe that top ranks of the government 
directed the recordings. If these claims turn 
out to be true, they would mar the secu-
rity successes of the surveillance program 
and would be counter evidence to Uribe’s 
claims that the program stamps out corrup-
tion. Former DAS director Miguel Maza 
Márquez believes that, “[o]ne has to arrive 
at the sad conclusion that it is a process 
identical to what the KGB used, when not 
only was the opposition being recorded, 
but so were some friends of the govern-
ment.” High-ranking officials have called 
for DAS’s disbanment. One ministry of 
defense source stated that the organization 
is too corrupt for reform.
africa
Movement Builds to Protect Albinos 
in East Africa
On March 20, 2009, the Legal and 
Human Rights Centre (LHRC) and the 
Tanzania Albino Society (TAS) filed a 
joint petition with the High Court of Tan-
zania, charging the government with fail-
ure to protect the rights and dignity of 
its albino population. Tanzania, with 40 
million inhabitants, is estimated to have a 
population of about 200,000 albinos.
Since early 2008, the international media 
has been full of grisly reports of approxi-
mately 45 albinos killed and mutilated by 
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traders, who allegedly sell albino body 
parts to witch doctors, who in turn use 
the body parts in casting spells for people 
seeking wealth. In East Africa, superstition 
holds that albinos bring luck and riches. 
The high prices paid for albino body parts 
has led to the recent spate of killings, 
which some attribute to organized crime 
rings. Such “harvesting” is not limited to 
Tanzania: it is also reported in neighbor-
ing Burundi, Kenya, and Uganda. More 
generally, discrimination and superstition 
against albinos is common across sub-
Saharan Africa, evidenced by the organiza-
tions created to protect albinos in South 
Africa and Nigeria.
In East Africa, the combination of 
international media attention and local 
advocacy efforts signal a growing call 
for change. The first albino Member of 
Parliament, Al-Shaymaa J. Kwegyir, was 
appointed in April 2008, pledging to fight 
discrimination. In June 2008, the Albinism 
Foundation of East Africa organized an 
Albino Awareness Day in Tanzania. As 
the spate of killings continued into 2009, 
the Canada-based organization, Under the 
Same Sun, called for a tourism boycott if 
the Tanzanian government did not act to 
prevent the violence. Finally, during his 
visit to Tanzania at the end of February 
2009, UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon 
condemned the killing of albinos.
At the beginning of March 2009, Tanza-
nian President Jakaya Kikwete announced 
the deployment of police to twenty-two 
provinces and urged the public to cooper-
ate by confidentially naming those who 
have participated in attacks on albinos. 
This move follows other government steps, 
including a 2007 amendment to the Witch-
craft Act, the arrest of over a hundred 
individuals involved in the albino trade in 
2008, and a campaign launched in January 
2009 to distribute special cell phones to 
albinos, so that they have a direct line to 
police in case of attack.
These steps did not come soon enough 
to divert the petition filed against the 
government by LHRC and TAS. Indeed, 
LHRC calls the recent government efforts 
“political measures,” pointing out that two 
hundred cell phones can hardly be serious 
help to the 200,000 albino citizens. The 
additional police deployment, it suspects, 
will only be short term.
The petition charges the government 
with breaching several articles of the 
Tanzanian constitution: Article 12, under 
which all human beings are recognized as 
free, equal, and entitled to dignity; Article 
14, which guarantees the right to life and 
to protection of life by society; and Article 
29(2), which guarantees every person equal 
protection under the law. Interestingly, the 
petition charges two grounds for violation: 
the failure of government ministries to 
provide skin protective gear and reason-
able health care services to albinos, many 
of whom die of skin cancer by age thirty; 
and the failure of these agencies to protect 
the lives of albinos from killings due to 
superstitious beliefs. The petition names 
the Tanzanian Attorney General, the Min-
istry of Health and Social Welfare, and the 
Ministry of Home Affairs.
Just days after the petition was filed, 
LHRC announced that TAS had withdrawn 
from the case for unexplained reasons. 
Some attribute the move to pressure by the 
government. The central TAS office in Dar 
es Salaam made the decision despite the 
protests of TAS affiliates from rural areas 
“upcountry,” where attacks on albinos are 
worse.
Nevertheless, LHRC reaffirmed its com-
mitment to move forward with the petition, 
which it hopes will result in a High Court 
declaration that the ministries have been in 
continuous breach of the constitution. In 
addition to such a declaration, LHRC seeks 
a High Court order for specific government 
action and compensation for the victims of 
mutilation and the families of murdered 
albinos. Such legal recourse is bold and 
unprecedented, adding a legal element to 
the already highly politicized issue.
Land Reform and Forced Evictions 
in Uganda
The Ugandan government’s latest push 
to move the Land Amendment Bill (intro-
duced in December 2007) forward in the 
legislature depicts the bill as a pro-tenant 
measure to address the problem of forced 
eviction. The real motivation for the bill 
and its anticipated affects are the subject 
of heated controversy, seemingly opposed 
or at least questioned by landowners and 
tenants alike.
Forced eviction is both an urban and 
a rural problem in Uganda, although to a 
lesser degree than in many African coun-
tries. Indeed, the 2006 Global Survey of 
Forced Evictions published by the Centre 
on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) 
praised President Yoweri Museveni for tak-
ing a “strong public stand against illegal 
evictions,” although it noted that both 
government agencies and private owners 
continue the practice.
In the last year, Ghetto Radio reported 
on the ongoing eviction and demolition 
of about 120 homes in the Kisenyi area of 
Kampala, during which agents of the land 
owner, a former Kampala mayor, distrib-
uted what appeared to be forged eviction 
notices bearing the name of the City Coun-
cil. In the Kayunga District, about 200 
kilometers northwest of Kampala, more 
than 17,000 people were evicted from their 
farms when the landlord sold his land to a 
Kampala businessman. According to the 
Foundation for Human Rights Initiative, 
these farmers received no compensation 
and many had nowhere to go but a dis-
placement camp.
Both government and private evictions 
often fly in the face of the law. For example, 
in February 2008, ten days after the mur-
der of a Belgian tourist at the Mt. Elgon 
National Park allegedly carried out by 
cattle thieves, the Uganda Wildlife Author-
ity (UWA) evicted more than 4,000 people 
from communities indigenous to the Mt. 
Elgon area. The UWA acted with the assis-
tance of the Ugandan military, known as the 
Uganda People’s Defense Forces, and justi-
fied its action as “humanely” addressing 
“encroachment in the park.” The eviction, 
however, directly contradicted an October 
2005 decision by the Uganda High Court 
in Mbale, which ruled that the Benet were 
the “historical and indigenous inhabitants” 
of the park and should be allowed to “carry 
out agricultural activities.”
In the face of such impunity, it is 
unclear how legislative reform alone could 
be expected to significantly protect ten-
ants against forced eviction. And, despite 
the tenor of the recent public campaign, a 
closer look at the Land Amendment Bill’s 
provisions increases skepticism. In a March 
11, 2009 editorial, the current Minister of 
Lands, Housing and Urban Development 
began with an apparently sympathetic over-
view of the underlying causes for forced 
eviction: landowners failing to give tenants 
notice before selling land; landlords’ and 
tenants’ inadequate knowledge of the law 
by both landlords and tenants; and land-
lords’ ability to gain lever support of local 
law enforcement and land administrators. 
The Minister’s subsequent overview of the 
proposed amendments is not as convincing. 
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For example, the bill proposes to criminal-
ize both illegal evictions and illegal tenants 
or trespassers—merely upping the ante on 
both sides.
The bill is a continuation of Museveni’s 
overall land reform begun in 1998, which 
attempts to modernize the confusion of 
overlapping systems of private, public, and 
customary ownership left after the colonial 
period and former President Idi Amin’s 
rule. Museveni’s reforms are met with 
general suspicion from both the Ugandan 
elite, who accuse him of trying to set up a 
system in which land may be sold to for-
eign business interests, and rights groups, 
who believe he is undermining communal 
land ownership more appropriate for the 
large population surviving on subsistence 
agriculture.
Nigeria Attempts to Criminalize 
Same-Sex Marriage
On March 11, 2009, the Nigerian 
National Assembly held a public hearing 
on the Same Gender Marriage (Prohibi-
tion) Bill, proposed in 2008. What captured 
most headlines was the demonstration by 
hundreds of young LGBT men and women 
organized by the Queer Alliance. Inside the 
hearing, a number of local rights groups—
Human Rights Watch, Global Rights, and 
Amnesty International—spoke against the 
bill, while religious groups, including the 
Anglican Church of Nigeria, spoke in its 
favor.
The proposed bill, which at this writing 
had yet to be put to a vote, seeks to broaden 
the criminalization of homosexuality in 
Nigeria, prohibiting not just same-sex mar-
riage but any form of same-sex cohabitation 
in which parties “intend to live together as 
husband and wife.” Homosexual activity 
is already illegal, punishable by up to 14 
years in prison, and same-sex marriage 
is not legal under any of Nigeria’s legal 
systems: the Marriage Act, Islamic law, 
or customary law. However, the proposed 
bill adds prison sentences of three years 
for anyone attempting to enter a same-sex 
marriage and five years for anyone “aiding 
and abetting” a same-sex marriage.
Rights groups struck a fairly moderate 
tone in opposing the bill, criticizing the 
overly broad definition of same-sex mar-
riage and its redundancy given Nigeria’s 
already-existing prohibitions on homo-
sexual activity. The law seems to provide 
additional legal grounds for the harassment 
of the LGBT community and human rights 
groups. Moreover, speakers emphasized its 
inconsistency with Nigeria’s international 
human rights commitments as a signatory 
to the African Charter on Human Rights, 
as a member of the UN Human Rights 
Council, and as party to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR).
The debate echoes the reaction to a 
similar but broader bill proposed in 2006, 
which never went to a vote. Hopefully, this 
bill will meet the same fate. As 23-year-
old Queer Alliance leader Rashidi Wil-
liams said during the demonstration, “It is 
already a trial to survive the hardship of 
our nation let alone the discrimination we 
face as sexual minorities.”
middLe eaSt and nortH africa
Iraq: Closing the Legal Loophole 
for Private Contractors
In March 2009, the widow of an Iraqi 
bodyguard killed by a drunken Black water 
guard filed suit in a California federal 
court against the security contractor and 
the employee, Andrew Moonen, accusing 
Blackwater of fostering an environment 
of impunity and lawlessness during its 
employment in Iraq. This suit was filed less 
than two months after the Iraqi government 
banned Blackwater from operating in Iraq 
because of the company’s role in the deaths 
of 17 Iraqi civilians during a shootout in 
Baghdad in September 2007. In December 
2008, in response to the international com-
munity’s cries to hold private contractors in 
Iraq responsible for their actions, U.S. fed-
eral prosecutors charged five Blackwater 
guards with manslaughter for the killings.
Currently, the 1,000 guards employed 
by the contracting company are immune 
from prosecution because they fall within 
a loophole in the Military Extraterrito-
rial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) as employees 
of the U.S. State Department. If a judge 
consents to jurisdiction, the prosecution of 
the Blackwater guards for their role in the 
Baghdad killings will be the first trial of 
non U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) 
contractors under MEJA.
Since being awarded a contract to pro-
vide security for American and Iraqi diplo-
mats in 2003, Blackwater has been involved 
in many disputes during the Iraq war. In 
February 2006, a Blackwater-employed 
sniper fired at Iraqi Media Network guards, 
killing three of them. Witnesses reported 
that the shootings were unprovoked, but 
the U.S. government refused to charge the 
sniper, stating that he acted appropriately.
The Iraqi government has complained of 
numerous other incidents involving Black-
water guards indiscriminately shooting at 
civilians. On September 17, 2007, Black-
water guards shot and killed 17 civilians in 
a crowded square in Baghdad. Prompted by 
a car that was driving in the wrong direc-
tion in its lane, Blackwater guards started 
shooting, killing the driver, his wife, and 
their infant child. The guards continued to 
shoot in the crowded square, killing more 
civilians trying to flee the area. Blaming 
the company for the innocent deaths of 
civilians, the Iraqi government revoked 
Blackwater’s license the next day. The U.S. 
government agreed with the Iraqi govern-
ment’s findings that Blackwater had used 
excessive force without provocation. In 
January 2009, the Iraqi government perma-
nently banned Blackwater from operating 
in the country, though the U.S. government 
continues to use the company for aerial 
transport in Iraq.
Though the trial of the five guards 
involved in the shooting is ongoing, the 
U.S. Justice Department faces significant 
legal hurdles in prosecuting the guards 
or any Blackwater employee for crimes 
committed in Iraq. Under MEJA, the U.S. 
government can try military personnel 
for murders of Iraqi civilians, but private 
contractors such as Blackwater are often 
immune from prosecution. MEJA only 
applies to DOD employees and Blackwater 
is employed by the State Department. This 
exception has allowed many contracting 
firms to escape liability and will likely be 
raised in the upcoming trial. Blackwater is 
thereby permitted to operate in an environ-
ment of impunity.
In response to the Baghdad shootings, 
the United Nations issued a report sug-
gesting that Blackwater’s actions may be 
a form of mercenary activity, illegal under 
international law. The U.S. government 
has countered this report, denying that 
Blackwater guards are mercenaries. Private 
contractors are immune from prosecution 
in Iraqi courts because of an exception 
created by the coalition government. Thus, 
families of victims killed by Blackwater 
guards will only find justice, if at all, in 
U.S. courts. This case will set the precedent 
of liability for private contractors in Iraq.
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Morocco: Police Brutality in Africa’s 
Last Colony
In February 2009, Moroccan police 
allegedly raped and assaulted a nineteen-
year-old Sahrawi woman in Western Sahara. 
This attack is just another in a trend of vio-
lence that has occurred since Morocco con-
trolled Western Sahara after Spain left the 
country in 1975. Since then, the Moroc-
can government has fought with Polisario 
Front, an independence party, for control 
of the region. Despite some steps towards 
sovereignty, both sides have accused each 
other of committing grave human rights 
violations. Moroccan police have histori-
cally used excessive force against Sahrawis 
and others involved in Polisario Front. The 
Moroccan government has indirectly sup-
ported the violence against innocent civil-
ians by failing to hold police responsible 
for their action.
Moroccan police officers often oper-
ate in an environment of impunity. The 
police have specifically targeted Sahrawis, 
members of Polisario Front, and individu-
als associated with human rights organiza-
tions and groups that have criticized the 
Moroccan government for its control over 
Western Sahara. Human rights organiza-
tions and independence parties are often 
not permitted to function and are forbidden 
by the government. Their supporters are 
frequently harassed by the police. Plain-
clothes police officers will typically arrest 
individuals on false charges and torture 
and interrogate them for connections to the 
independence movement.
Demonstrators have also accused police 
of using violence against their peaceful 
protests. In 2007, a fourteen-year-old girl 
was arrested and beaten after a demonstra-
tion supporting independence; the gov-
ernment failed to investigate the assault. 
Human rights organizations have received 
reports of police abuse, but no police 
officer has been charged for any crime 
committed during the year. The U.S. State 
Department notes that of the 12 complaints 
received since 2005 alleging police abuse 
acknowledged by local authorities, none 
were investigated.
Morocco has signed and ratified several 
international human rights instruments that 
require it to respect the rights of its citizens 
and those in Western Sahara. In particular, 
Morocco has ratified both the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the UN Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(CAT). Under both documents, police offi-
cers are forbidden from committing many 
of the actions of which they have been 
accused, such as arbitrary arrests and tor-
ture of detainees. The ICCPR grants indi-
viduals in Morocco the right to assemble 
and join political parties and human rights 
organizations. Further, under CAT, the 
Moroccan government has a responsibility 
to investigate allegations of torture, espe-
cially when the accused are police officers. 
It has failed to do so. Responding to the 
allegation of police rape in February 2009, 
the Moroccan government has denied that 
anyone was even questioned in the terri-
tory that day. Unless further action is taken 
to bring those responsible to justice, this 
charge will likely disappear as all the oth-
ers have.
Iran: President Obama’s 
Willingness to Negotiate
In a marked difference from prior U.S. 
policy, President Barack Obama released 
a video message for Iran on Nowruz, the 
Persian New Year. In the video, Obama 
emphasized that the U.S.-Iran relationship 
is changing and that it will be based on 
diplomacy and “mutual respect.” Obama 
urged the Iranian government to dispose of 
hostile actions and to improve its society 
through peaceful means. Although human 
rights abuses are rampant in the Islamic 
Republic and have continued under the 
administration of President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad, Obama’s message focused on 
improving relations with Iran to combat its 
aggressive stance toward the United States. 
Improving human rights and curbing Iran’s 
nuclear threat, however, can be mutually 
exclusive goals. These dual objectives can 
be achieved through negotiations.
Though the Iranian Constitution guaran-
tees equality among ethnicities, protection 
of women’s rights, and freedom of speech 
and religion, it also states that these rights 
are conditional on the principles of Islam, 
which religious clerics have the power to 
interpret. As a result of this constitutional 
conditionality, human rights abuses have 
occurred throughout Iranian society. Iran 
is second only to China in the number of 
executions, with nearly 350 in 2008. Rely-
ing on the clerics’ interpretation of Shari’a 
law, Iran has executed people for “crimes” 
such as political opposition, adultery, and 
homosexuality.
Women also face severe abuses with 
limited access to education and other ser-
vices, disproportionate punishments, unfair 
trials, and other violations. Women’s rights 
activists have been arbitrarily arrested for 
attempting to collect signatures for a peti-
tion. Iran also persecutes religious minori-
ties despite offering nominal protection 
in the Constitution. In early 2008, seven 
leaders of the Bahá’i faith were arrested 
and charged with spying for Israel, a com-
mon tactic used by the Iranian government 
to persecute religious minorities. Ethnic 
minorities have also faced systematic 
abuse when they have demonstrated for 
increased rights. In February 2008, hun-
dreds of Iranian Azerbaijanis were arrested 
and detained for peacefully demonstrat-
ing for education services in their local 
language.
The Obama administration’s willingness 
to engage Iran establishes a new precedent 
by the United States, which has a legacy of 
hostility toward Iran. President George W. 
Bush’s policies and his inclusion of Iran 
in the “axis of evil” further antagonized 
US-Iran relations. The current administra-
tion has taken a different approach with 
Obama’s Nowruz video and Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton’s endorsement of 
Iranian involvement in negotiations about 
Afghanistan. Iran’s poor human rights 
record should be an important factor in any 
negotiations. Incorporating human rights 
in future U.S.-Iran negotiations will send a 
message to the world that the United States 
values engagement in both peaceful diplo-
macy and an agenda that promotes human 
rights. While the Obama administration 
appears to be focusing on nuclear capa-
bilities, ending human rights abuses in Iran 
could be part of the “peaceful actions” that 
Obama implores Iran to adopt.
europe
Guantánamo Detainee Questions 
UK’s Role in Torture
A terrorist suspect recently released 
from Guantánamo Bay is charging the UK 
government with disregarding its legal 
and moral obligations to its citizens. UK 
granted Binyam Mohamed political asy-
lum in 1994. In 2001, Mohamed traveled 
to Afghanistan. During his trip, Pakistani 
police detained Mohamed for suspected 
terrorist activities. Mohamed claims that he 
simply wanted to visit a Muslim country. 
However, British and United States (US) 
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officials maintain that Mohamed admit-
ted traveling to Afghanistan to receive 
paramilitary training with Al-Qaeda. At 
the time of his arrest, Mohamed was not 
traveling with his own passport.
Pakistani police transferred Mohamed 
to US custody. In the three years that 
followed, the US government subjected 
Mohamed to the practice of extraordinary 
rendition, which provides for the extraju-
dicial transfer of a suspect from one state 
to another. During this time, Mohamed 
was moved between prisons in Morocco 
and Afghanistan. He then spent five years 
at Guantanamo Bay until his release in 
February 2009, almost a full year after the 
charges against him were dropped.
Officials brutally and systematically 
tortured Mohamed in each detention facil-
ity. Moroccan officials cut Mohamed’s 
penis and poured chemicals on his wounds. 
In Afghanistan, officers hung Mohamed 
by his wrists for days and subjected him 
to sensory deprivation. Officials at Guan-
tánamo forced Mohamed to write a false 
confession detailing his plans to detonate 
a dirty bomb, and told Mohamed that he 
would have to testify against other detain-
ees if his case was ever brought to trial.
Mohamed’s case presents the question 
of when a state should come to the aid of 
citizens who have been accused of terror-
ist acts. Of the UK government, he says 
“[T]he very people who I had hoped would 
come to my rescue . . . allied themselves 
with my abusers.” Human rights advo-
cates condemn the British government for 
its complicity with Mohamed’s torture. 
Mohamed himself reached out to the gov-
ernment while in Guantánamo, authoring 
a letter to Prime Minister Gordon Brown 
which invoked his right to a fair trial and 
asked the government to intervene. Still, no 
definitive action was taken.
Some organizations claim that the Brit-
ish government played a more direct role 
in Mohamed’s torture. Just weeks after 
his release from Guantánamo, the media 
released telegrams written by British intel-
ligence agency MI5. The telegrams show 
that MI5 colluded with Mohamed’s tortur-
ers by feeding them questions and request-
ing an interrogation timeline. On at least 
one occasion, an MI5 agent assisted with 
the interrogations.
Advocates are demanding that the Brit-
ish government make amends by releas-
ing documents related to the treatment of 
Mohamed during his detention. Foreign 
Secretary David Miliband has conveyed 
an unwillingness to release the papers, cit-
ing precarious relations with the U.S. This 
concern was validated when judges of the 
High Court decided to publish intelligence 
provided to them by the U.S. The U.S. 
quickly responded that this would be per-
ceived as a threat and that the government 
would reconsider its intelligence-sharing 
policies.
Regardless of its standing with the 
U.S., human rights officials are calling for 
remedial British action. The allegations 
of torture were recently referred to Brit-
ain’s Attorney General Patricia Scotland, 
who launched a criminal investigation. 
However, international advocates question 
the legitimacy of this investigation and 
whether true action will be taken.
Europe Sees Drastic Rise in  
Human Trafficking
Human trafficking is the second larg-
est and fastest growing illegal industry in 
the world. This is particularly evident in 
Europe, where human rights experts say 
many countries are experiencing a drastic 
surge in the trafficking of human beings. 
For example, Lithuanian police report that 
in the last few years, hundreds of Lithu-
anian women have been rescued from the 
sex trafficking industry in London alone. 
Nearly 20% of these victims were under-
age. Police also noted that Lithuania is 
a popular transit state, with traffickers 
from Russia and Belarus passing through 
on their way to more popular trafficking 
destinations.
These destinations are often Western 
European countries. Police in Northern 
Ireland (NI) recently expressed concern 
over the growing rate of trafficking in the 
country. Security Minister Paul Goggins 
declared NI was “no longer immune from 
the vile crime of human trafficking,” and 
announced a government initiative to pre-
vent traffickers from entering the country 
while offering support services to those 
victims who are discovered.
Despite these efforts, international orga-
nizations are expressing concern that Euro-
pean countries are not taking the action 
needed to address this growing epidemic. 
A recent United Nations (UN) report stated 
that most countries’ conviction rates of 
traffickers rarely exceed 1.5 per 100,000 
people, which is “below the level normally 
recorded for rare crimes . . . and propor-
tionately much lower than the estimated 
number of victims.” The report also warns 
that many countries’ concerns are quelled 
by unreliable statistics that don’t convey 
the depth of the problem.
Organizations such as the Council of 
Europe warn that the crisis has reached 
“epidemic proportions.” Advocates say the 
trafficking industry is booming due to the 
global economic recession. Trafficking has 
a global annual market of roughly $42.5 
billion, and the recession has led thousands 
of people to seek alternative work oppor-
tunities. Fronting as legitimate operations, 
traffickers prey upon people’s economic 
vulnerabilities and sell them into forms of 
modern-day slavery in the sex trade and 
domestic labor markets.
In recent years, government agencies 
have taken more serious steps to combat 
trafficking. Since 2003, the proportion of 
UN member states with legislation out-
lawing the major forms of trafficking has 
risen from 1 in 3 to 4 in 5. In March 2009, 
the European Commission proposed new 
legislation aimed particularly at the sex 
trafficking of children. These laws would 
make it possible to punish European Union 
(EU) citizens who abuse children in non-
EU countries, organizers of sex-tourism 
trips, and internet predators. Victims would 
also receive accommodation and medical 
care, police protection, and free legal aid.
International watchdogs warn that 
implementing new legislation is a slow-
moving process. These groups identified 
two key approaches to combat trafficking 
on a localized level: increasing understand-
ing and awareness of what trafficking is, 
and enforcing harsher sanctions against 
those convicted of trafficking. But in the 
face of a global trafficking crisis, many 
fear these efforts will not be enough.
High-Profile Murders Highlight 
Government Abuse in Chechnya
A string of high-profile murders in 
Chechnya has garnered the attention of 
human rights advocates amidst allegations 
that Russian-backed president Ramzan 
Kadyrov has been “systematically remov-
ing any opposition to his absolute rule.”
Ruslan Yamadayev and his brother 
Sulim were once members of a prominent 
Chechen family who had publicly fallen 
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out with Kadyrov after accusing his admin-
istration of torture and murder. In October 
2008, Ruslan was shot to death in Moscow 
as his brother’s car stopped at a stoplight. 
Just months later in March 2009, Sulim 
was shot multiple times in an underground 
parking garage in Dubai. Although Sulim’s 
younger brother told reporters that his 
brother was unconscious but alive, Russian 
authorities confirmed Sulim’s death a few 
days after the shooting.
Chechen Umar Israilov was forced to 
live in exile after similarly accusing Kady-
rov of murdering those who pose a threat to 
his rule. In written legal complaints, Israilov 
accused Kadyrov and his aides of torturing 
and executing their rivals. Israilov worked 
closely with advocates and journalists to 
uncover stories of abduction, detention, 
disappearances, extrajudicial executions 
and torture committed by both Russian 
and Chechen authorities. In January 2009, 
Israilov was hunted down at his home in 
Austria and fatally shot in broad daylight.
Advocates say these murders hint at 
the longstanding political instability of 
the region. Chechnya has particularly 
struggled since Russia launched its “anti-
terrorist” operations in the region ten years 
ago. These operations targeted separatist 
groups who sought Chechen independence 
from Russia. Although the Russian govern-
ment has said peaceful Chechen civilians 
“have nothing to fear,” it is believed that 
over 100,000 people have been killed due 
to fighting between the states.
Advocates say that the human rights sit-
uation in Chechnya has deteriorated under 
Kadyrov’s rule. In 2006, the Parliamen-
tary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
(PACE) issued a report denouncing Chech-
nya’s history of murder, torture, kidnap-
ping and arbitrary detention and criticizing 
the “governments, member states, and the 
Committee of Ministers of Europe [which] 
have failed to address the ongoing human 
rights violations in a regular, serious, and 
intensive manner, despite the fact that such 
violations still occur on a massive scale.”
Despite this call for action, interna-
tional organizations have yet to intervene. 
Advocates now fear that the situation in 
Chechnya may worsen as Kadyrov recently 
announced that Russia’s anti-terrorism 
campaign will soon come to an end. As 
a result, more than 20,000 Russian troops 
would be pulled out of the region, leaving 
the majority of community policing to 
Kadyrov’s administration.
The lack of international support 
recently moved local Chechen advocates to 
action. Chechnya’s human rights ombuds-
man, Nurdi Nukhazhiev, has confirmed 
the creation of a database to track citizens 
who have been kidnapped or disappeared, 
as well as the formation of a laboratory to 
begin identifying the remains of exhumed 
mass graves. While advocates say this is 
a step in the right direction, international 
legal forums must continue to hold the 
Chechen government accountable for its 
crimes against humanity.
SoutH and centraL aSia
Kyrgyzstan’s Human Rights 
Situation in Flux
On February 26, 2008, human rights 
activist Vitaly Ponomarev was denied entry 
into Kyrgyzstan. Ponomarev arrived in the 
Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek but was deemed 
a persona non grata and was forced to 
return to Russia. Ponomarev is a mem-
ber of Memorial, a Russian based human 
rights organization that released a report on 
Kyrzygstan’s human rights abuses shortly 
before Ponomarev’s expulsion.
The Memorial report details abuses 
stemming from protests in the impover-
ished region of Nookat in southern Kyrgyz-
stan. In October 2008, a group of Muslim 
residents of Nookat protested a prohibition 
on prayer and celebration marking the 
Muslim holiday of Eid al-Fitr. The protest 
led to some property damage of a govern-
ment building and police injuries. As a 
result, over thirty people were arrested.
Furthermore, the report exposed the 
torture inflicted upon the arrestees in order 
to obtain confessions. Aziza Abdirasulova, 
a human rights defender in the office of 
Kyrgyzstan’s Ombudsman, affirmed the 
use of torture and asserted that the arrest-
ees were beaten, exposed to boiling and 
freezing water, and forced to sing the 
national anthem. The government asserts 
that the protestors are members of Hizb 
ut-Tahrir, a banned Islamic fundamentalist 
group. Tursunbek Akun, the Ombudsman 
of Kyrzygstan, claims, however, that only 
four of the 32 convicted protestors are Hizb 
ut-Tahrir supporters. Furthermore, Akun 
seeks to present his findings to Parliament 
and have the convictions and prison sen-
tences reviewed.
Due to the use of torture, Ponomarev’s 
deportation, and recently proposed legisla-
tion that would impose restrictions on non-
governmental organizations, some human 
rights advocates argue that Kyrzygstan is 
slipping into an authoritarian regime akin 
to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Unlike the 
latter two countries, however, Kyrzygstan’s 
new Ombudsman is a respected human 
rights advocate and political dissident 
whose outspoken discourse about govern-
mental abuses may evidence Kyrzygstan’s 
greater transparency. Even though the 
Kyrgyz Ombudsman is appointed by the 
President and approved by Parliament, the 
department maintains independence from 
the executive and recommends proposals 
to strengthen human rights. Such indepen-
dence contrasts with Uzbekistan and Turk-
menistan where, as reports claim, officially 
appointed watchdogs are beholden to the 
executive. Nevertheless, the Ombudsman’s 
role is constrained to investigations and 
policy recommendations to the govern-
ment, which it may implement on a discre-
tionary basis.
Kyrzygstan has recently acceded to an 
important UN human rights instrument: 
the Optional Protocol to the United Nations 
Convention against Torture (OPCAT). 
The OPCAT allows the UN to monitor 
prison conditions and prisoner treatment 
within the country’s detention facilities and 
requires that a local independent enforce-
ment mechanism also be created. Cur-
rently, a civil society coalition is assessing 
what local mechanism to institute and 
will likely suggest that the Office of the 
Ombudsman take a lead role in preventing 
torture. The Kyrzygstan Ombudsman may 
have the opportunity to expand its role 
from an investigatory body that recom-
mends policy changes to an institution that 
is instrumental in enforcing international 
human rights law in Kyrgyzstan.
Pakistan Accedes to Taliban’s Law
In February, 2009, the government of 
Pakistan accepted a peace agreement with 
the Taliban and associated militants in the 
Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan 
(NWFP). The agreement, known as the 
Malakand Accord, includes the cessation 
of fighting between the Taliban and the 
Pakistani army in the greater Malakand 
region of the NWFP. Furthermore, the 
accord permits the Taliban to impose their 
version of Sharia law in the region, affect-
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ing more than four million people. The Tal-
iban already control much of the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan.
Known as the Switzerland of Pakistan, 
the Swat Valley is part of the greater Mala-
kand region, which was once a scenic tour-
ist haven. It became a war zone, however, 
as the Pakistani army battled the Taliban 
and their militant allies. Numerous resi-
dents have fled their homes to escape the 
violence, although some have returned due 
to the accord.
Before the peace deal, the legal system 
in Swat was a mixed Sharia-civil system 
where Islamic clerics advised judges in 
civil courts. Appeals were heard in a high 
court in Peshawar under the civil code and 
the Pakistani Supreme Court remained 
the final arbiter under the civil code. This 
system, however, was deemed insufficient 
for radicals such as Maulana Fazlullah, the 
pro-Taliban militant leader in Swat.
Known as the “Radio Mullah,” Faz-
lullah and his cohorts broadcast incendi-
ary speeches that describe “un-Islamic” 
activities and list the names of beheaded 
transgressors. Before the February agree-
ment, Fazlullah forcibly implemented a 
brutal version of Sharia law in Swat. This 
version of Sharia law, now officially sanc-
tioned under the Malakand Accord, is just 
one version of Sharia law amongst many 
and is advocated mainly by the Taliban and 
other radicals.
The imposition of a harsh version of 
Sharia law in Swat bears the hallmarks of 
the Taliban’s previous rule in Afghanistan: 
music is banned, shops must close during 
calls to prayer, and a system of reporting 
“un-Islamic” behavior has been imple-
mented. Political opponents are beheaded 
and public beatings are common for minor 
infractions.
A sharp curtailment of women’s rights 
is also in effect. Women are forbidden to 
leave the home without accompaniment 
from a male relative. During the conflict, 
the Taliban demolished more than 170 
girls’ schools and imposed a ban on female 
education. Some reports assert that the 
peace accord has allowed girls to return to 
school while others maintain that the ban 
is ongoing.
Additionally, a disturbing video dis-
playing the Taliban’s contempt of women’s 
rights has recently circled the internet. The 
video shows a 17-year-old girl subjected 
to public flogging on mere suspicion of 
having an affair. The newly reinstated, 
independent-minded Chief Justice Iftikhar 
Chaudhry ordered a probe into the incident 
and summoned officials from the NWFP 
to the Pakistani Supreme Court, subject-
ing them to criticism. The extent of the 
civil courts’ power to oversee activities 
in Swat is currently unclear, but is likely 
diminished, if not obliterated, due to the 
Malakand Accord.
A parallel system of law has been cre-
ated in Swat. The new Sharia courts have 
been established as traditional lawyers and 
judges in region have been banned from 
practice. Sharia judges have replaced civil 
law ones and many expect these new 
judges to judicially enforce the Taliban’s 
harsh version of Sharia. Although a Sharia 
judge in Swat recently ruled against the 
Taliban in a land dispute, it still remains 
unclear whether judgments against the 
Taliban will continue or if a judge would 
rule against the Taliban in a criminal case 
involving “un-Islamic” activities.
The Pakistani government has touted 
the benefits of the peace agreement as it 
claims that the deal would relieve military 
presence in the area, reduce harm to civil-
ians, and redress dissatisfaction with the 
judiciary. On the other hand, commentators 
such as Talat Masood, a retired lieutenant 
general of the Pakistani army, claim that 
the deal has strengthened the Taliban and 
presents a great danger of further expan-
sion of Sharia law.
Children and Prison Reform in 
India’s Tihar Prison
On March 17th, 2009, a judge in New 
Delhi, India ordered that a six-year-old boy 
known as Sameer, who had been staying 
with his imprisoned father at Tihar Prison, 
be released to the care of the local gov-
ernment’s social welfare department. The 
judge asserted that the boy’s placement in a 
department-run home and local school will 
promote the best interests of the child.
Tihar Prison in New Delhi is one of 
the largest prison complexes in the world, 
housing about 12,000 inmates despite an 
official capacity of approximately 6,250. 
According to Indian law, children can stay 
with incarcerated mothers until they reach 
the age of five. Some criticize this policy, 
arguing that poor conditions in prisons 
present challenges to child development 
and safety. Maheni Giri, a women’s rights 
activist, has campaigned for prison reform 
to prevent other inmates from abusing 
children in prisons. Tihar has implemented 
such reform and allows non-governmental 
organizations to visit its facilities as a 
check on inhumane conditions.
Reforms taken by Inspector General 
of Prisons, Kiran Bedi in the early and 
mid-1990s jettisoned Tihar’s reputation as 
a poorly-run prison. Bedi implemented 
detoxification programs for drug addicts, 
yoga and meditation groups, and education 
programs. Various civil society groups are 
active in Tihar running these programs, as 
are local universities such as Delhi Univer-
sity, whose law students advise the prison-
ers of their rights. Furthermore, other local 
non-governmental organizations provide 
day care, recreation, health care, and edu-
cation for children at Tihar.
Despite the reforms and the positive 
contributes of civil society, the problem of 
over-crowding threatens the safety, hygiene, 
and equitable distribution of resources for 
inmates and their children. The Human 
Rights Law Network, an Indian non-gov-
ernmental organization, blames the glacial 
pace of the Indian judicial system and the 
inability for many inmates to pay fines as 
direct causes of prison over-crowding.
Whether children should stay with incar-
cerated mothers or be placed with relatives 
or in other homes remains a contentious 
issue. While Tihar is an example of positive 
reform, inmates and their children languish 
in meager conditions in other prisons of 
India. The Tihar Prison, with its emphasis 
on rehabilitation and vigorous civil society 
involvement, may be an example of how to 
improve the quality of life for both children 
and their incarcerated parents.
eaSt and SoutHeaSt aSia
ASEAN Human Rights Body Lacks 
Power to Investigate and Punish
The Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) celebrated the creation 
of its Human Rights Body (AHRB) in Feb-
ruary 2009 as a historic first step towards 
confronting human rights violations in the 
area. The body appears to lack sufficient 
power to investigate or penalize human 
rights violators, such as the military regime 
in Burma. A draft of the terms of reference 
was discussed at the 14th ASEAN Summit 
in Thailand in late February, with the final 
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instrument expected to be ready for confir-
mation by July 2009.
Subject to the approval of the terms of 
reference, the establishment of an ASEAN 
human rights body, which would cover an 
estimated 570 million people throughout 
the 10 member states, will be announced at 
the 15th ASEAN Summit in October 2009. 
A reading of the draft, however, reveals 
a number of logistical issues. The human 
rights body would “promote and protect 
human rights and fundamental freedoms” 
throughout Southeast Asia, but will con-
tinue to abide by the bloc’s steadfast policy 
of non-interference in member states’ inter-
nal affairs. The draft of the terms of refer-
ence, which outlines the proposed powers 
of the future human rights body, falls short 
of key demands expressed by international 
human rights groups. Amnesty Interna-
tional, upon evaluation of the terms of 
reference, predicted that the body will have 
limited effectiveness unless it can impose 
sanctions or expel countries that violate the 
rights of their citizens.
Summit delegates, however, are opti-
mistic about the body’s evolution into 
an effective defender of human rights in 
the region. The establishment of a human 
rights body is a momentous and highly 
controversial action for the bloc, marking 
the efforts of the region to move towards 
democracy. Thailand’s Sihasak Phuangket-
keow, chairman of the drafting committee, 
described the human rights body as a work 
in progress, claiming that its powers will 
evolve over time. Phuangketkeow stated 
that “investigative powers should not be 
ruled out. We’ll take it step by step. We 
have to go as far as we can, but at the same 
time we have to be realistic.”
ASEAN’s ten member states include a 
few small democracies, authoritarian states, 
a monarchy, and a military junta. The bloc 
itself has long been criticized as an alliance 
which forges agreements by consensus 
and steers clear of confrontation; a crucial 
factor that may impede progress for an 
eventual human rights body. According 
to the terms of reference, the body would 
follow the principles of non-interference in 
member states’ internal affairs and would 
“respect the right of every member state to 
be free from external interference, subver-
sion, and coercion.” The instrument further 
states that any decisions made by the 
group “shall be based on consultation and 
consensus,” effectively giving Myanmar 
and other violators a veto power to block 
unfavorable decisions.
While the notion of an ASEAN human 
rights body is an exciting step towards 
democracy and equality of rights, the exist-
ing terms of reference indicate that it will 
lack the necessary power to become an 
effective tool in the region. The body must 
possess the power to enforce and repri-
mand if it is to make any difference in the 
region. Though the draft of the terms of 
reference is a landmark step in the direc-
tion of human rights, many are hopeful 
that the final provision presented in July 
2009 will embody a much stronger and 
solid version.
Claims of Police Torture Emerge  
in Malaysia
Politicians and citizens of Malaysia 
called for the establishment of an inde-
pendent and impartial body to investigate 
claims of police torture stemming from the 
death of a Malaysian citizen. Kugan Anan-
than died on January 20, 2009 after being 
held for five days in a Taipan police station 
on suspicions of auto theft.
Chief of Police Datuk Khalid Abu 
Bakar stated that Kugan was in the pro-
cess of interrogation when he requested a 
glass of water and suddenly collapsed. The 
police initially claimed that Kugan died of 
“breathing difficulties,” but a post-mortem 
report found that he died due to excess 
fluid in his lungs.
Kugan’s family strongly contested Abu 
Bakar’s statements. On January 20th, 
approximately 50 people stormed through 
the mortuary where Kugan’s body was 
taken for evaluation. Some took pictures of 
his body, revealing signs of severe bodily 
injury, and alleged that the police were 
responsible for his death. Parliament mem-
bers and political party representatives 
responded to the allegations, calling for 
an immediate investigation into Kugan’s 
death and into police investigative tactics 
in general.
This is not the first assertion of police 
torture in Malaysia. Since 2005 the Royal 
Commission to Enhance the Operation and 
Management of the Royal Malaysia Police 
(Royal Commission), a government-created 
body, lodged several reports on people who 
have died while in police custody. In light 
of these findings, the Royal Commission 
proposed an independent external police 
oversight body to oversee complaints of 
police misconduct, as well as institute a 
code of practice relating to the arrest and 
detention of persons. It also proposed the 
establishment of an independent custody 
officer responsible for the welfare and cus-
tody of every detainee. None of these rec-
ommendations for reform, however, have 
been implemented.
Malaysia was scheduled for review by 
the United Nations Human Rights Council 
(UNHRC) on February 11, 2009. UNHRC 
regularly reviews the human rights situ-
ations in all UN member states. Though 
the reports have yet to be released, human 
rights organizations domestically and inter-
nationally expect Kugan’s death, along 
with additional claims of police torture, to 
be of central importance. The report will 
likely also focus on the lack of action by 
the Malaysian government.
Kugan’s death came on the heels of a 
prior claim of police torture in December 
2008. B. Prabakar, a 27 year old Malaysian 
citizen, alleged that he was tortured by 
at least ten police officers in the state of 
Selangor. These claims of torture included 
beatings with a rubber hose, splashing 
boiling water on the body, and threaten-
ing death with a cloth tied around the 
neck. Seven of those ten officers were 
charged with “criminal intimidation” and 
“voluntar[ily] causing hurt to extort con-
fession,” to which they have collectively 
pled not guilty.
Though members of parliament and var-
ious political parties have called attention 
to the Kugan incident, the Malaysian gov-
ernment has done little to remedy the situa-
tion. Many have called for an investigation 
into interrogation tactics, but little progress 
has been made. Malaysia should, first and 
foremost, implement the recommendations 
made by the Royal Commission as a check 
on police power. This, along with future 
UNHRC recommendations, would bring 
about great reform and establish com-
pliance with international human rights 
standards.
Discriminatory HIV/AIDS 
Legislation in South Korea
South Korean Minister of Justice Kim 
Kyung-Han pledged “an open society for 
all” in response to claims of discriminatory 
legislation towards people living with HIV/
AIDS. In a Korea Times op-ed entitled 
“Breaking Down Walls of Discrimination,” 
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Minister Kyung-Han stated that the South 
Korean government recently began pushing 
for a “proactive immigration policy that 
shifts the focus from regulation and control 
to openness and exchange” in regards to 
those diagnosed with the disease.
The South Korean legislature was heav-
ily criticized within the past year for its 
blatant discrimination against both citizens 
and aliens diagnosed with HIV. The state 
continues to implement legislation which 
restricts entry to those with HIV and 
regularly deports those diagnosed. South 
Korea’s practice of deporting people living 
with HIV gained notoriety in 2008 when 
a Chinese citizen of Korean descent who 
was visiting his mother in South Korea 
was tested for HIV, and upon the finding 
of a positive diagnosis, was detained and 
eventually deported. The National Human 
Rights Commission, finding the legislation 
outrageous, represented him in front of the 
Seoul High Court, and the order for depor-
tation was eventually overturned.
The Seoul High Court wrote that 
“[p]ublic health goals must be balanced 
against the rights to privacy and to receive 
medical treatment, and that detection and 
treatment rather than deportation are the 
most effective means of curbing the spread 
of HIV.” Despite the positive message set 
by the High Court and Minister Kyung-
han, the legislature has barely reformed its 
policies. A parliament bill was introduced 
in December 2008 which sought to expand 
the requirements to obtain work visas. 
Under this bill, immigration officials could 
require drug and HIV testing from any for-
eigner seeking a work visa.
South Korea’s restrictions on entry and 
residence for people diagnosed with HIV 
violate a number of international human 
rights norms which prohibit discrimina-
tion and uphold the notion of equality. 
The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, to which South Korea 
is a signatory party, broadly guarantees 
the right to equal protection of the law 
without discrimination. This provision has 
generally been interpreted to include a 
ban on discrimination based on health. 
More specifically, the 2001 Declaration 
of Commitment on HIV/AIDS mandates 
that member states, such as South Korea, 
enact legislation to eliminate all forms of 
discrimination against people living with 
HIV/AIDS.
South Korea’s rigidly discriminatory 
restrictions on entry and residence will 
do little to promote a healthier and safer 
country. Enacting widespread, discrimina-
tory legislation leads to secretive networks 
lacking the proper treatment and false 
information. South Korea’s legislation, in 
fact, will more than likely lead to further 
spread of the disease. However, a more 
open immigration policy which respects 
human rights would better deal with this 
threat to human health.
Both the World Health Organization 
(WHO) and the United Nations (UN) 
uphold this belief, with the WHO declar-
ing in 1987 the screening of international 
travelers for HIV to be an ineffective public 
health policy. UN Secretary General Ban 
Ki-Moon echoed this sentiment at the UN 
General Assembly High Level Meeting 
on HIV/AIDS in June 2008, stating that 
“[i]n the world as a whole, I call for a 
change in the laws that uphold stigma 
and discrimination, including restrictions 
on travel for people living with HIV, both 
because stigma drives the virus under-
ground, where it can spread; and as 
important, it is an affront to our common 
humanity.” Though Seoul has done little 
in the face of legislative reform, there are 
high hopes that Minister Kyung-Han and 
the Seoul High Court can work together to 
abolish these discriminatory policies. HRB
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